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Employer Sanctions and
Discrimination: The Case for
Repeal of the Employer
Sanctions Provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986
Aaron Schwabacht
INTRODUCTION
The employer sanctions provisions of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) impose fines on employers who hire un-
documented aliens.' The provisions were enacted in an effort to discour-
age illegal immigration to the United States. The sanctions have
succeeded in achieving this goal, at the cost of widespread employment
discrimination against the millions of authorized workers in this country
who appear or sound "foreign."
Section I of this article briefly discusses the employer sanctions pro-
visions, as a background for an understanding of the discriminatory im-
pact of sanctions.
A serious side effect of the employer sanctions provisions has been
widespread discrimination against workers and job seekers who appear
foreign, particularly Latinos and Asians. Section II of this article dis-
cusses the discrimination which resulted from employer sanctions. In
f Aaron Schwabach is an Instructor in Law at the University of Miami School of Law. He
graduated from Antioch College in 1985 with a B.A. in Political Science and from Boalt Hall School
of Law at the University of California at Berkeley in 1989. At the time of the writing of this article
Mr. Schwabach was a law clerk for OCAHO.
1. Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a.
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particular, the third report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) on
employer sanctions is discussed, because of its importance to the possible
repeal of the sanctions provisions.
Section III of this article discusses possible cures for the discrimina-
tion problem. This article then concludes by examining the assumptions
underlying employer sanctions and analyzing the merits of possible reme-
dies for IRCA-related discrimination.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of IR CA
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)2 is a
patchwork of political compromises. The employer sanctions provisions
were first introduced by then-House Judiciary Committee Chairman Pe-
ter Rodino (D-NJ) in 1972, fourteen years before they were finally en-
acted.3 In 1981, the Select Commission on Refugee Policy recommended
employer sanctions in order to "demagnetize the magnet" which attracts
undocumented workers to the United States.4
Opponents of employer sanctions argued that sanctions would result
in discrimination against foreign-appearing applicants, particularly those
of Hispanic or Asian origin.5 In an attempt to allay fears of such dis-
crimination, Congress enacted section 274B of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b, prohibiting discrimination
against foreign-appearing individuals authorized to work in the United
States, at the same time as the employer sanctions provisions. 6 As an
additional safeguard, IRCA contains a built-in review provision allowing
Congress to terminate employer sanctions after three years if they result
in widespread discrimination.7
B. The Employer Sanctions Provisions of IRCA
Although the sanctions provisions are adequately discussed
elsewhere,' a brief description of the specific provisions and the mechan-
2. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1151 et seq.
3. N. MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986: ANALYSIS, TEXT, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY 31 (1987).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 31-32, 46-47.
6. Both 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a and 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b became effective on November 6, 1986.
7. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(l).
8. See. e.g., MONTWIELER, supra note 3, at 31-45. The background of IRCA and problems
encountered in implementing the employer sanctions provisions are discussed in a report published
jointly by the RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute, M. FIx and P. HILL, ENFORCING EM-
PLOYER SANCTIONS: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES (1990). A bibliography listing legislative his-
tories of IRCA can be found at Id. at 43 n. 1.
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ics of their operation will aid in understanding sanctions-related
discrimination.
1. Scope
The employer sanctions provisions of IRCA apply to all employers
who employ workers in the United States, as well as persons or entities
who recruit such workers or refer them for a fee. All government enti-
ties, as well as all private employers, regardless of size, are covered.
2. Content
The employer sanctions provisions of IRCA make it illegal for em-
ployers to knowingly hire, recruit, or refer for a fee persons unauthorized
to work in the United States,9 or to continue to employ any person hired
after the enactment of IRCA knowing that that person is unauthorized
to work in the United States.10
During a six-month "public information period" beginning on De-
cember 1, 1986, penalties were not enforced.1 During that period, the
INS made a half-hearted effort to disseminate information on the sanc-
tions provisions to employers. This effort generally took the form of
mailing a "Handbook for Employers," describing the requirements of
IRCA. 12
During the year following the six-month public information period,
employers were entitled to receive a warning citation for a first offense,
rather than incurring a monetary penalty.13 Following this one-year
grace-period, employers violating IRCA became subject to the statutorily
prescribed penalties.
8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(e)(4) [Section 274A(e)(4) of the INA] estab-
lishes the following schedule of penalties for violations of sections
1324a(a)(1)(A) and 1324a(a)(2):
First offense: Civil money penalty of $250 to $2,000 for each alien
illegally employed.
Second offense: Civil money penalty of $2,000 to $5,000 for each
alien illegally employed.
Third offense: Civil money penalty of $3,000 to $10,000 for each
alien illegally employed.
Pattern of practice violations: Criminal penalties of up to six
months imprisonment and/or a $3,000 fine.
9. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(a)(1)(A).
10. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(2).
11. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(i)(1).
12. The GAO report, infra note 42, at 87, found that the INS had carried out its educational
duties "satisfactorily."
13. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(i)(2).
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Although the intent of the law was to target enforcement against
repeat violators, 14 in practice nearly all sanctions imposed have been for
first offenses. 5 While this might seem to indicate that sanctions have
been effective in deterring repeat violations, it is far more likely that the
INS simply lacks the resources to check up on past offenders.
3. Verification Requirement
In addition to penalizing the knowing employment of unauthorized
aliens, IRCA requires employers to verify the eligibility for employment
of all employees hired for employment in the United States after Novem-
ber 6, 1986.16 This requirement serves the dual purpose of preventing
employers from arguing that they were unaware that an employee was
unauthorized, and reducing the likelihood of discrimination by requiring
inspection of the documents of all employees, not merely those of foreign
appearance. The employer must complete an Employment Eligibility
Verification Form (Form 1-9) for each employee, and make the form
available to the INS upon request. 7 Every employee who is hired for
employment in the United States after November 6, 1986, must attest,
under penalty of perjury, that he or she is legally entitled to work in the
United States. The employee must then present documents establishing
his or her identity and right to work.'"
The employer is not required to become an expert in identifying
forged documents. If that were the case, some employers might tend to
scrutinize the documents of foreign-appearing applicants more closely
than those of other applicants, or to require additional documentation
from foreign-appearing applicants. In order to reduce the discriminatory
impact of the verification requirement, IRCA provides that if the docu-
ments presented by an employee reasonably appear, on their face, to be
genuine, the employer must accept them. 19
Employers must retain the Forms 1-9 for three years after an indi-
vidual is recruited, referred, or hired, or for one year after the individ-
ual's employment is terminated, whichever is later.2°
14. MONTWIELER, supra note 3, at 34.
15. Based on author's experience working at OCAHO for approximately one year.
16. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(l)(B); 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(b).
17. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(b).
18. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(b). The statute lists three types of documents: documents establishing
identity, documents establishing right to work, and documents establishing both identity and right to
work. The prospective employee must present either a document establishing both identity and right
to work, such as a United States passport, or a document establishing identity (such as a state
driver's license) and a document establishing right to work (such as a United States birth certificate
or an INS employment authorization form).
19. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(b)(1)(A).
20. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(b)(3).
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a Verification (Paperwork) Penalties
For each missing, incomplete, or improperly completed Form 1-9,
the employer is subject to a civil money penalty of $100 to $1,000.21 The
statute specifies that in determining the amount of the penalty, "due con-
sideration shall be given to the size of the business of the employer being
charged, the good faith of the employer, the seriousness of the violation,
whether or not the individual was an unauthorized alien, and the history
of previous violations.
' 22
4. Procedure
The procedures used by INS Investigations and the Border Patrol to
detect section 1324a violations, and the priority given to section 1324a
enforcement, vary greatly from region to region.23 Some offices deal with
employers through a regulatory investigative process aimed at detection
of section 1324a violations. Others make sanctions an extension of the
traditional INS "workplace survey" (the INS' euphemistic term for an
immigration raid) process, apprehending undocumented aliens at their
place of employment and then fining the employers.24 Some INS offices
make employers the primary target of sanctions enforcement, while
others use sanctions enforcement as a way to identify undocumented
workers for deportation. 5
Following a determination by INS Investigations or Border Patrol
agents that an employer has violated IRCA, the INS issues a Notice of
Intent to Fine to the employer. 26 The Notice itemizes the violations and
states the fine to be imposed for each.
The employer may then, within 30 days of receipt of the Notice,
request a hearing with the Attorney General, to be conducted before an
administrative law judge. 27 The administrative law judges hearing em-
ployer sanctions cases are nominally employed by the Office of the Chief
Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), a division of the Department of Justice.28
Most of the administrative law judges are actually full-time employees of
other agencies, particularly the National Labor Relations Board, and
hear OCAHO cases on a part-time basis.
21. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(e)(5).
22. Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. sec. 68.50(c)(2)(iv).
23. Fix AND HILL, supra note 8, at 85.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 8 C.F.R. sec. 272a9.
27. 8 C.F.R. sec. 274a9(d).
28. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION HANDBOOK
2, 6-7 (no date).
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OCAHO proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act2 9 and OCAHO's own rules.3" The administrative law judges en-
courage the parties to settle the case rather than go through a formal
adjudicatory hearing. In most cases, the parties reach a settlement
whereby the INS agrees to accept a reduced fine and, in the case of know-
ing hire violations, 3' the employer agrees to cease and desist from such
violations.
The decision of the administrative law judge becomes final unless,
within 30 days, it is modified or vacated by the Attorney General, in
which case the Attorney General's decision becomes the final order.32
The final order may then be appealed, within 45 days, to a U.S. Court of
Appeals.33
5. Termination of Sanctions
Fears of widespread discrimination as a result of employer sanctions
led to the inclusion of a termination provision in the employer sanctions
provisions of IRCA.34 The General Accounting Office (GAO) is re-
quired to compile an annual report for three years following the enact-
ment of IRCA, investigating whether employer sanctions have resulted
in a pattern of employment discrimination based on national origin.
3 5
Each report is to include a specific determination 36 and any GAO recom-
mendations to remedy the situation.37
Each GAO report is to be reviewed by a joint task force, consisting
of the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Commission on Civil
Rights and the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission.38 If the report contains a determination that employer sanctions
have resulted in discrimination, the task force is to make legislative rec-
ommendations on the report to Congress.39 The House and Senate Judi-
ciary Committees are required to hold hearings on any report of the joint
task force within 60 days after the receipt of such report.'
The employer sanctions termination provision of IRCA states that,
if the third GAO report finds that a widespread pattern of discrimination
29. 5 U.S.C. sec. 1001 et seq.
30. 28 C.F.R. sec. 68 (1987).
31. 8 U.S.C. see. 1324a(a)(1)(A) (1988).
32. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(e)(7)(1988).
33. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(e)(8)(1988).
34. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(1)(1988).
35. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(j)(B).
36. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(j)(2).
37. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(o)(3)(1988).
38. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(k)(1).
39. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(k)(2).
40. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(k)(3).
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has resulted from employer sanctions, and, if within 30 days of receipt of
the report, Congress approves the findings of the report by a joint resolu-
tion, the employer sanctions provisions will terminate.4
The third GAO report did, in fact, find that employer sanctions
have resulted in widespread discrimination.42 However, the thirty-day
period has long since elapsed. Although resolutions to approve the re-
port and thus repeal sanctions were introduced, none of them passed.43
The joint task force has met, but as of the time of this writing it has
issued no report.
C. Anti-Discrimination Provisions
Since the first employer sanctions legislation was introduced, Latino
organizations have argued that sanctions would result in discrimination,
as employers would be reluctant to risk sanctions by hiring foreign-ap-
pearing individuals." The requirement that the authorization docu-
ments of all new employees be inspected was deemed insufficient
protection, and INA section 274B was added.45
Section 1324b prohibits employers with four or more employees
from discriminating against individuals on the basis of national origin or
citizenship status." Protection under the citizenship clause is limited to
citizens and "intending citizens," that is, aliens legally present in the
United States who "evidence an intent to become citizens."
47
Section 1324b establishes a Special Counsel for Immigration-Re-
lated Unfair Employment Practices, to be appointed by the President
within the Department of Justice.48 An individual who believes that he
or she has been a victim of discrimination may file a complaint with the
Office of the Special Counsel (OSC) within 180 days of the alleged dis-
criminatory action.49 The Special Counsel is directed to investigate each
complaint within 120 days of its receipt. If the Special Counsel deter-
mines that there is reasonable cause to believe the complaint to be true,
he or she will then bring it before an OCAHO administrative law judge.5°
41. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(1).
42. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 3 (March 1990) (hereinafter GAO report).
43. See, e.g., H.J.Res. 534, H.J.Res. 536. H.J.Res. 534 survived, and at the time of this writing
has become the primary vehicle for total repeal of the employer sanctions provisions.
44. See, e.g., Fix and HILL, supra note 8, at 28-29, 32; MONTWIELER, supra note 3, at 31-32,
46-47.
45. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b.
46. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(a)(l).
47. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(a)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324(a)(3) [definition of "citizen or intending
citizen"].
48. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(c).
49. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(d)(3).
50. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(d)(1).
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In cases alleging "knowing and intentional discriminatory activity
or a pattern or practice" of discrimination, if the Special Counsel fails to
file a complaint with OCAHO within 120 days, the person alleging dis-
crimination may bring a private action before OCAHO.5
Procedure before and appeals from OCAHO follow the same pat-
tern as employer sanctions actions. 2 If the administrative law judge ad-
judicates the matter after a hearing, he or she may award up to two years
back pay, as well as a civil money penalty of up to $1,000 per individual
discriminated against for first violations and up to $2,000 per individual
for subsequent violations.53 Attorney's fees can be awarded, but only in
cases where the losing party's suit was frivolous.
5 4
The anti-discrimination provisions of IRCA are linked to the em-
ployer sanctions provisions. If employer sanctions had been repealed by
joint Congressional approval of the GAO report, such action would have
simultaneously repealed the anti-discrimination provisions.55 Since sec-
tion 1324b is intended to prevent only that discrimination which occurs
as a result of fear of sanctions, passage of any measure to repeal sanctions
will probably require a repeal of the anti-discrimination provisions as
well.
II.
DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS
The GAO report found that "there was widespread discrimination
... as a result of IRCA,"5 6 and surveys conducted by independent orga-
nizations have reached the same conclusion.
5 7
A. Hiring Audits
The GAO and several local organizations conducted hiring audits in
which pairs of testers with closely matched job qualifications applied for
the same jobs.
51. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(d)(2).
52. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
53. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(g)(2)(B).
54. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(h).
55. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324b(k)(1).
56. GAO report, supra note 42, at 3.
57. See, e.g., COALITION FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF Los ANGELES, Employer
Sanctions: A Costly Experiment (March 1990) (hereinafter CHIRLA report); A. KAMSVAAG AND
A. MISCHEL, Employment Discrimination Against Immigrants: A Study of the Job Seeking Exper-
iences of People who Speak English With an Accent (March 15, 1990) (hereinafter CHIRLA Prelimi-
nary Report). Several other studies on IRCA-related discrimination are summarized in the GAO
report, supra note 42, at 80-86.
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1. The GAO Audit
In the GAO audit, each pair consisted of one Hispanic tester and
one white non-Hispanic tester ("Anglo"). 8 All of the testers had one to
five years of work experience plus at least one year of college, and all
were fluent in spoken and written English. When applying for jobs, all of
the testers stated that they were United States citizens.59
The GAO audited the hiring practice of 360 employers in San Diego
and Chicago. In each case, the testers applied for the same entry-level
position. The audit showed a significant difference in the percentages of
Hispanic and non-Hispanic testers at three levels of the job search pro-
cess: (1) reaching the job application stage, (2) receiving a job interview,
and (3) receiving a job offer."
Overall, the non-Hispanic testers encountered unfavorable treat-
ment in eleven percent of the cases. In thirty-one percent, the Hispanic
tester was treated unfavorably; in fifty-eight percent, there was no differ-
ence in the treatment accorded the two testers.6' The GAO took the
eleven percent of cases in which the non-Hispanic testers encountered
unfavorable treatment to be the percentage due to random factors, such
as an employer's bad mood, rather than to systematic discrimination.6 2
Another possible explanation, overlooked by the GAO, is that some em-
ployers prefer to hire Latinos; however, the difference in the percentage
of unfavorable treatment is the same, regardless of its cause.
Subtracting that eleven percent gives the result that, in twenty per-
cent of all cases, the Hispanic tester encountered unfavorable treatment
not attributable to random factors;63 the Hispanic tester was three times
as likely as the non-Hispanic tester to encounter unfavorable treatment.
The non-Hispanic testers had relatively little advantage at the first
stage in their hiring process; they were only. five percent more likely to
complete the job application phase. However, the non-Hispanic testers
were 33 percent more likely to receive an interview, and 52 percent more
likely to receive a job offer."
Even though the audit showed a widespread pattern of discrimina-
tion against Hispanic applicants, it is not clear that the discrimination
resulted from fear of employer sanctions. Only five percent fewer His-
58. GAO report, supra note 42, at 46.
59. Id. at 50.
60. Id. at 47.
61. Id. There was no statistically significant difference between the two cities in the level of
unfavorable treatment encountered by the Hispanic tester, who encountered unfavorable treatment
in Chicago 33 percent of the time and in San Diego 29 percent of the time. Id. at 48.
62. Id. at 48.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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panic testers completed job applications, and all of them stated on the
application that they were United States citizens.65 However, the per-
centage of unfavorable treatment encountered by the Hispanic testers
rose sharply at the interview and job offer stages,66 suggesting that fac-
tors other than fear of sanctions exacerbated existing discrimination.67
2. The New York Human Rights Commission Audit
A similar audit was conducted by the City of New York Commis-
sion on Human Rights in June, 1989.68 Pairs of matched testers of the
same sex, with similar qualifications and backgrounds, called employers
in response to randomly selected "Help Wanted" advertisements from
the four New York City daily newspapers. One tester in each pair spoke
English with a foreign accent; the other had no accent.69
Eighty-six employers were audited. The testers asked each em-
ployer whether the position was open, whether the tester could come for
an interview, and what papers the tester should bring.7"
In all, forty-one percent of the employers audited treated the ac-
cented testers less favorably."1 Sixteen percent of the employers con-
tacted told the accented tester that the position was filled and later told
the unaccented tester that the position was still open. Twelve percent
scheduled interviews only with unaccented testers, and thirteen percent
required significantly different documents from accented testers than
from unaccented testers.72
3. The CHIRLA Audit
Between November 7 and December 19, 1989, the Coalition for Hu-
mane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) conducted a hiring
audit similar to the New York audit. Each pair consisted of a tester who
spoke English without a foreign accent, and one who spoke English with
a "noticeable, but clear and understandable" Spanish accent. 73 In each
pair the accented tester was slightly more qualified than the unaccented
65. 1d. at 49.
66. Id. at 48.
67. The GAO report, supra note 42, does not take this view; it holds that the discrimination
revealed by the hiring audit resulted from IRCA.
68. CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Tarnishing the Golden Door: A
Report on the Widespread Discrimination Against Immigrants and Persons Perceived as Immigrants
Which Has Resulted from the Immigration Reform and ControlAct of1986 (August 1989); discussed
in the GAO report, supra note 42, at 82; CHIRLA preliminary report, supra note 57, at 2.
69. GAO report, supra note 42, at 82.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 83.
73. CHIRLA preliminary report, supra note 57, at 3.
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tester for the jobs sought.74
The advertisements replied to were selected at random from news-
papers in the Los Angeles area. In each case the unaccented tester called
after the accented tester. This was done because the accented tester was
often told that the job was filled; by having the unaccented tester call
second, the tester could verify whether the position was, in fact, filled."
Out of 199 pairs of calls completed by the testers, the accented tester
received less favorable treatment 31.7 percent of the time. In 20.1 per-
cent of the calls, the unaccented tester was considered for the position
while the accented tester was not. In 11.5 percent of the calls, the ac-
cented tester was treated less favorably in some other way.76 In 5.5 per-
cent of the calls, the unaccented tester was treated less favorably.77
B. Other Research Methods
Even if the hiring audits conducted by the GAO and other organiza-
tions cannot conclusively demonstrate that discrimination resulted from
the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA, there is ample other evi-
dence that IRCA caused discrimination.
The GAO employed five research methods in addition to the hiring
audit. Three of these methods - an employer survey, a survey of job
applicants, and analysis of complaints filed with the OSC - produced
results supporting the GAO's conclusion that employer sanctions have
resulted in widespread discrimination. Two other methods - "before
and after IRCA" analyses of (1) job placement rates in state employment
agencies and (2) discrimination charges filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) - did not detect a widespread pat-
tern of discrimination. With these latter two methods, however, the
GAO believes that various factors in the data masked the discrimination
revealed by the other methods.78
1. Employer Survey
In late April of 1989, the GAO mailed a questionnaire to 9,491 ran-
domly selected employers. Those employers who did not respond were
mailed a second questionnaire in June. In August, those employers who
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 5. Note that these percentages do not add to the total (31.7 percent) because of
overlap; some calls involved less favorable treatment for the accented tester in more than one cate-
gory. Id. at 5, n. 7.
77. Id. at 5, n. 7; note that the unaccented caller was slightly less qualified than the accented
caller. In addition, the possible causes of the unfavorable treatment received by the non-Hispanic
tester in eleven percent of the cases in the GAO report (see note 62 and accompanying text) are
equally applicable here.
78. GAO report, supra note 42, at 37.
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had not yet responded were telephoned, and a third questionnaire was
sent to those who agreed to respond.
79
From the results, the GAO estimated that, of the population of 4.6
million employers from Which the sample was drawn, 19 percent
(891,000) began discriminatory practices because of IRCA.8 0 Ten per-
cent (461,000) discriminated on the basis of an individual's foreign ap-
pearance or accent; this group reported hiring an estimated 2.9 million
employees during 1988. Nine percent (430,000) discriminated solely on
the basis of citizenship status; this group reported hiring an estimated 3.9
million employees during 1988.1
The percentage of employers who reported beginning one or more
discriminatory practices in response to IRCA greatly exceeded the na-
tional average of 19 percent in two areas: Los Angeles (29 percent) 82
and Texas (28 percent). 3
An estimated five percent (227,000) of employers began a practice of
not hiring persons who appeared foreign or had a foreign accent.8 4 Eight
percent (346,000) reported that they applied IRCA's verification require-
ment only to foreign-looking or foreign-sounding individuals.8 5 Fourteen
percent (666,000) began a practice of: (1) hiring only individuals born in
the United States, or (2) not hiring persons with temporary work eligibil-
ity documents. 86 In each category of discrimination, Los Angeles and/or
Texas led the nation.87  The rate of discrimination in industries employ-
ing a high proportion of Latinos and Asians differed little from the rate
in industries employing low or medium proportions of Latinos and
Asians.88
Although the results clearly showed that employers began discrimi-
natory practices as a result of IRCA, the survey provides no concrete
information on the effect on Latino and Asian workers. However,
among employers who stated that IRCA had caused them to begin hiring
only U.S.-born persons, seventy-six percent had no Latino or Asian em-
ployees; among other employers, only 65 percent had no Latino or Asian
employees. In areas with large Latino and Asian populations, the differ-
ence was even greater: 54 percent of employers hiring only U.S.-born
79. Id. at 27-28; an analysis of the questions as revealing certain types of discrimination (citi-
zenship or national origin) is at Id. at 39; a detailed description of the survey results, including a
copy of the questionnaire, can be found in Appendix III of the report, Id. at 115-22.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id. at 41.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 43.
87. Id. at 41-43.
88. Id. at 44-45.
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workers had no Latino or Asian employees, compared to 38 percent of
other employers. 9 Without information on the composition of the job
applicant pool, however, the impact of the discrimination cannot be
measured.
2. Survey of Job Applicants
In July and August, 1989, the GAO surveyed three hundred indi-
viduals who stated that they had applied for a job since January 1, 1989.
One hundred and fifty of these persons had no foreign accent; all were
U.S. citizens. The remaining one hundred and fifty had foreign accents.
Of this second group of one hundred and fifty, one hundred and twenty-
seven were temporary resident aliens, twenty-one were permanent resi-
dent aliens, one was a political asylee, and the immigration status of one
was unknown. The persons surveyed were questioned only about the
most recent job for which they had applied.'
The GAO found that IRCA's verification requirements were applied
unevenly. Of the one hundred and fifty foreign-sounding applicants, one
hundred and forty-four (96 percent) reported that they were asked to
show work authorization during the job application process, compared to
sixty-six (44 percent) of the one hundred and fifty non-foreign-sounding
applicants.9" The GAO concluded that, since the verification require-
ments did not exist before IRCA, uneven application of the requirement
is a new form of discrimination resulting from IRCA.92
However, the foreign-sounding applicants were more successful in
actually obtaining jobs; one hundred and four (69 percent) received job
offers, compared to sixty (40 percent) of the non-foreign-sounding appli-
cants.93 The GAO attributed the disparity in part to the different sources
from which the subjects were drawn. The foreign-sounding individuals
were selected from organizations providing educational services to tem-
porary resident aliens, while the persons with no foreign accent were se-
lected from state employment agencies.94 The non-foreign sounding
individuals were thus more likely to have had previous difficulty in ob-
taining a job.
3. Analysis of Discrimination Charges Filed with the OSC
Between the time of the enactment of IRCA and October 30, 1989,
the OSC received seven hundred and eight charges of discrimination, at
89. Id. at 43-44.
90. Id. at 32. For detailed results and a copy of the questionnaire, see Id. at 151-53.
91. Id. at 153.
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id. at 154.
94. See Id. at 32.
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least eighty-one of which were also filed with the EEOC.95 This number
is absurdly low, considering the GAO's estimate that 861,000 employers
began discriminatory practices during the same period. It reflects a fail-
ure on the part of the Justice Department to make the 1324b anti-dis-
crimination process available to the public it is supposed to serve.
Of those seven hundred and eight charges, five hundred and eight-
een have now been closed. In four hundred and thirty-five, the OSC de-
termined that the charges were unfounded, filed too late, not within its
jurisdiction, or that there was insufficient data to investigate the charge.
In eighty-three cases, a settlement was reached; four of these settlements
included civil monetary penalties against the employer.
9 6
Of the one hundred and ninety cases remaining open, the OSC
stated that more information was needed in seventy-four. One hundred
and five cases were under investigation, and complaints had been filed
before an administrative law judge in eleven cases.9 7  Although rela-
tively few of the many potential complainants filed complaints with the
OSC, the number of charges is actually greater than the OSC initially
expected to receive.9 8 Even the slight amount of action taken by the OSC
indicates that it has found some discrimination to have resulted from
IRCA.
The small number of complaints filed with the OSC is a result of
several factors, including the nature of employment discrimination, the
time and expense involved in administrative proceedings, and the obscu-
rity of the OSC. Many victims of discrimination (such as job seekers
who are told that a position has already been filled) may be unaware that
they have been discriminated against. Even those who are aware of dis-
crimination may be unaware of the existence of OSC. Those who realize
that the OSC offers a remedy may lack the time, resources, or inclination
to pursue a legal remedy.
4. Analysis of Job Placement Rates in State Employment Agencies
Before and After IRCA
The GAO examined the rates at which Latinos and other minorities
found jobs through state employment agencies in Florida, Illinois, and
Texas from 1982 to 1989 - before and after the passage of IRCA.99
There was no significant difference between the placement rates before
and after the passage of IRCA. 1
95. Id. at 53.
96. Id. at 54.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 32-33.
100. Id. at 57.
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The GAO attempted to explain the absence of any difference in pre-
and post-IRCA placement rates by stating that employers who use state
employment services expect to find a high percentage of minorities
among those applicants, and thus may be less prone to discriminate.1 '
Another possibility, not mentioned by the GAO, is that employers rely
on the screening processes of state employment agencies to ensure that
job applicants referred by those agencies are authorized to work in the
United States.
5. Analysis of Data on Discrimination Charges Filed With EEOC
Before and After IR CA
The EEOC provided the GAO with a list of one hundred and sixty-
eight cases that the EEOC believed might be IRCA-related. As of Sep-
tember 15, 1989, the EEOC had closed one hundred and forty-six of
these cases, fifty-eight of which (40 percent of the closed cases) had been
settled. 102
The number of IRCA-related complaints filed with the EEOC has
generally declined during most quarters since the second quarter of
1987.1 0 The flow of national origin discrimination charges into the
EEOC from 1979 to 1989 showed no significant increase following the
passage of IRCA. 0" However, the GAO did not consider the number of
complaints filed with the EEOC to be a sensitive indicator of IRCA-
caused discrimination. The GAO report expresses the opinion that the
number of complaints filed with the EEOC depends on the job appli-
cants' and employees' awareness of discrimination, and that it is unlikely
that the passage of IRCA would have any effect on this awareness. 05
C. Complaints Received by Immigrants' Rights Groups
Fourteen organizations collected data for the GAO on complaints
about employment discrimination. Between July 1, 1988 and June 30,
1989, these organizations received 1,200 complaints.' 0 6
101. Id. at 59.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 57.
104. Id. at 59.
105. Id. at 58.
106. Id. at 80-81. The fourteen organizations reporting to the GAO were:
American Friends Service Committee/Newark
Center for Immigrant Rights, Inc./New York City
Central American Refugee Center/Los Angeles
Chicago Commission on Human Relations
Church Avenue Merchants Block Association, Inc./New York
CHIRLA
Community Task Force on Immigration Affairs/Houston
MALDEF/Chicago
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Seventy-two percent of the complaints received came from aliens au-
thorized to work in the United States. Four percent came from United
States citizens, and the remainder from unauthorized aliens or persons
whose immigration status was unknown. Of the nine hundred and thir-
teen complaints received from citizens or authorized aliens, five hundred
and sixty-seven (62 percent) appeared to be related to the employer sanc-
tions provisions of IRCA according to EEOC criteria." 7 The most fre-
quent allegation was that employers refused to accept valid work
authorization documents.'o The majority (83 percent) of the authorized
workers complaining of discrimination were Hispanic."
D. Discriminatory Impact on Employers
A joint study by the Rand Corporation and the Urban Institute
views the primary problem with employer sanctions enforcement as poor
administration by the INS rather than lack of awareness of the verifica-
tion requirements on the part of the employers. 10 The report points out
that "the enforcement effort - and the burden of coping with inspec-
tions and fines - falls heavily on small firms owned by ethnics.""' Ran-
dom targeting of employers produces a low number of section 1324a
enforcement actions. As a result, the INS has adopted a variety of "spe-
cial emphasis" techniques for detecting section 1324a violators." 2 Eth-
nic restaurants, 1'3 and especially in New York, the garment industry, 114
have been frequent targets of INS "special emphasis" enforcements.
Some INS officials feel that the pattern of section 1324a enforcement
MALDEF/San Francisco
MALDEF/Los Angeles
New York City Commission on Human Rights
Travelers Aid Services/New York
Archdioceses of Detroit
Maricopa County Organizing Project
In November 1989 the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) in
conjunction with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) issued a report entitled THE HUMAN
COSTS OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GAO's THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986
107. Id. at 81.
108. Id. at 81-82.
109. Id. at 82.
110. Fix and HILL, supra note 8, at 84-86.
111. Id. at 85.
112. Id. at 97-100. Among the most ethically questionable of these techniques is the use of
Department of Labor records of petitions for labor certification. (Petitions for permission to hire a
worker previously ineligible to work in the U.S.) The INS may investigate the employer to deter-
mine whether the person whom the employer wishes to hire is, in fact, already employed by that
employer. This technique will inevitably discourage employers from applying for labor certification
for either current or prospective employees.
113. Id. at 118.
114. Id. at 98.
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raises the possibility of lawsuits for selective enforcement."1 5 INS agents,
however, are driven by quotas. In the words of one INS official: "Sensi-
ble targeting is not done. We go after few certain cases. It's like shooting
fish in a barrel.""1 6 Thus, IRCA has resulted in discrimination not only
against workers of color but against business owners of color.
E. Delays in Issuing Work Authorization Documents
The sluggishness of the INS bureaucracy in issuing work authoriza-
tion documents to those who are entitled to them has also resulted in
discrimination. In the New York metropolitan area alone, over 10,000
eligible workers have been denied employment because of INS delays in
issuing documents." 7 Similar delays exist nationwide,' 18 causing em-
ployers to fire or refuse to hire authorized workers who, because of INS
delays, have not yet obtained their work authorization documents.
III.
POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION
The thirty-day period for automatic repeal of the employer sanc-
tions provisions by Congressional approval of the third GAO report has
now expired. "9 There are currently three courses of action which Con-
gress can take in response to the GAO's finding of widespread discrimi-
nation resulting from IRCA. First, Congress can do nothing, and leave
the employer sanctions provisions in place. Second, Congress can amend
IRCA to reduce the extent of discrimination. Such an amendment might
take the form of strengthening the anti-discrimination provisions or sim-
plifying the verification system. Finally, Congress could repeal the em-
ployer sanctions provisions.
A. Anti-Discrimination Provisions
INA section 274B has failed to provide adequate protection for the
victims of IRCA-related discrimination. Only seven hundred and eight
charges of discrimination were filed with the OSC during the three years
following the enactment of IRCA. 2' In contrast, the fourteen independ-
115. Id. at 118.
116. Id.
117. NEW YORK STATE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS, Workplace
Discrimination Under the Immigration Reform and ControlAct of 1986. A Study of Impacts on New
Yorkers (November 4, 1988): discussed in GAO report, supra note 42 at 85.
118. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, Public Hearings
on the Impact and Effectiveness of the Employer Sanctions and Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (January 11, 1990); discussed in the GAO report,
supra note 42, at 84.
119. See, supra note 42, and accompanying text. The GAO report is dated March 29, 1990.
120. GAO report, supra note 42, at 52.
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ent organizations reporting to the GAO reported receiving five hundred
and sixty-seven IRCA-related complaints from authorized workers in a
single year. 121
If sanctions are to be retained, the role of the OSC will have to be
increased. Currently, the anti-discrimination provisions are no more
than a token, without any real impact on IRCA-related discrimination.
B. GAO Recommendations
The GAO found that much of the reported discrimination resulted
from employer misunderstanding of IRCA's verification requirements.' 22
The GAO recommended reducing this form of discrimination by:
(1) increasing employer understanding of the verification require-
ments through effective education efforts,
(2) reducing the number of different types of work eligibility
documents,
(3) making the documents harder to counterfeit, and
(4) requiring the new documents of all members of the
workforce. ' 23
Although much lip-service is paid to increased education, little
funding is available for the purpose. For the 1990 fiscal year, Congress
appropriated a mere one million dollars to the OSC for anti-discrimina-
tion education activities. 24
The INS plans to reduce the number of types of different work au-
thorization documents it issues (currently ten) to two by the mid-1990's.
The new documents will be much more difficult to counterfeit. However,
the change will be carried out only if sufficient funding and personnel are
available.' 25 It is the GAO's fourth suggestion, requiring all workers to
carry a standardized work authorization document, that is likely to pro-
voke the greatest opposition. To many people, the type of document sug-
gested by the GAO sounds too much like the "national identity card"
long opposed by civil rights groups.1 26 In response to the concerns of
these groups, IRCA includes a provision that it shall not "be construed
to authorize, directly or indirectly, the issuance or use of national identi-
121. See notes 106-109, supra, and accompanying text.
122. GAO report, supra note 42, at 72.
123. Id.
124. The GAO advocates increased OSC spending on education. GAO report, supra note 42, at
73, 79. The one million dollars that was spent was the Attorney General's response to an earlier
GAO suggestion, contained in the second annual report on IRCA, that spending on education be
increased. General Accounting Office, STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AFTER
SECOND YEAR 61 (November 1988).
125. GAO report, supra note 42, at 7.
126. See, e.g., CHIRLA report, supra note 57, at 12-13 (condemning idea of national identity
card).
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fication cards or the establishment of a national identification card. ' 12 7
However, IRCA also anticipates the possibility of a specifically-designed
work authorization card, and provides that no one may be required to
carry such a card on his or her person, or to present such a card for any
other purpose than proof of authorization to work.1 28  An option dis-
cussed by the GAO, and which has frequently been proposed, is enhance-
ment of the existing Social Security number system.129 At the time of
this writing, Representative Barney Frank is considering introducing a
bill calling for an "enhanced Social Security card."1 30
Expansion of the Social Security card, however convenient it might
be administratively, seems closer to a "national identity card" system
than to the type of work authorization card contemplated by IRCA.
C. Repeal of Employer Sanctions
Advocates of immigrants' and persons' of color rights tend to favor
repeal of employer sanctions. CHIRLA calls employer sanctions "an ex-
periment which has caused a great deal of suffering for many segments of
our society - citizens and immigrants, workers and businesses" and
concludes that "[i]t is time to declare employer sanctions a failed effort
that should be ended now. 131
Manuel Romero, San Francisco regional counsel for the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), has also
called for repeal of employer sanctions, saying that "fairness and com-
mon decency demand that Congress should no longer treat the Latino
and Asian communities as guinea pigs for immigration policy."'
' 32
MALDEF has been joined by the National Council of La Raza (NCLR)
in calling for repeal of employer sanctions.
Several members of Congress have introduced legislation to repeal
or modify the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA. These bills fall
into two groups: total repeal of employer sanctions, and modification of
employer sanctions by simplifying the verification process and/or by
strengthening IRCA's anti-discrimination provisions.'
33
127. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(c).
128. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a(d)(2)(G).
129. GAO report, supra note 42, at 75.
130. Letter from Cecilia Mufioz, National Council of La Raza, May 22, 1990.
131. CHIRLA report, supra note 57, at 4.
132. Tuller, 1986 Immigration Law Breeds Bias, GAO Says, San Francisco Chron., March 30,
1990, at A-1.
133. Reporting on pending legislation in an article of this nature is a somewhat futile exercise,
given the evanescent nature of bills in committee. At the time of this writing, significant bills in-
cluded H.R. 4421 (Bryant; strengthening of anti-discrimination provisions, plus education), H.J.
Res. 534 (Roybal; total repeal), H.R. 4300 (Morrison; some strengthening of anti-discrimination
provisions, plus removal of "intending citizen" requirement). Several others had already died in
committee, while still others were rumored to be in the works.
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Sponsors of total repeal bills include Representative Edward Roybal
(D-CA), who has stated that repeal of employer sanctions "is going to be
an uphill battle, but let me dream a little bit and say that I think it's
possible.'34
IV.
CONCLUSION
IRCA's employer sanctions provisions have succeeded in "demag-
netizing the magnet," that is, in reducing the flow of undocumented im-
migrants to the United States. 35 At the same time, however, employer
sanctions have resulted in widespread employment discrimination, par-
ticularly against individuals with Latino and Asian backgrounds.
Attempts to deal with the discrimination caused by IRCA can be
classified as "repeal" or "reform." Repeal of employer sanctions is the
only complete remedy for IRCA-related discrimination, as it removes the
cause of that discrimination. Any attempts at reform rather than repeal,
acknowledge the underlying legitimacy of employer sanctions. Employer
sanctions are legitimate only if the goal which they accomplish, "demag-
netizing the magnet," is legitimate. During the many discussions of em-
ployer sanctions, attention has generally been focused on either the
effectiveness of sanctions or the likelihood of discrimination. There has
been surprisingly little debate as to whether reducing the flow of immi-
grants to the United States is a desirable or morally legitimate goal.
There are two reasons why the United States might wish to reduce
the flow of immigrants. The first is the belief that the flow of immigrants
threatens the stability of the United States in some way, such as by
threatening the jobs of workers already in the country. If true, this is a
legitimate concern. The second reason is xenophobia; this is, of course, a
morally reprehensible reason for reducing the flow of immigration. It is
impossible to evaluate the extent to which the passage of the employer
sanctions provisions was a product of the first concern, and to what ex-
tent it was a product of the second; however, both elements were surely
present.
If "demagnetizing the magnet" is not a desirable or morally accepta-
ble goal, there is no question that employer sanctions should be termi-
nated. Even if one accepts the premise that decreasing the attractiveness
of the United States to potential immigrants is an acceptable or desirable
134. Tuller, supra note 132.
135. GAO report, supra note 42, at 3. But cf. K. CRANE, B. AsCH, J. HEILBRUNN, AND D.
CULLINANE, THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS ON THE FLOW OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMI-
GRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES (April 1990). The CRANE booklet, jointly published by the
RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute, holds that the actual effect of sanctions on illegal
immigration has been considerably less than initially expected.
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goal, there is still the question of discrimination. The employer sanctions
provisions of IRCA have caused discrimination against foreign-appear-
ing workers; this discrimination can be reduced, but not entirely elimi-
nated, by legislative and administrative reform measures. The
discrimination outweighs any possible utility of employer sanctions.
Rather than attempting to fix the problem by patching it over with still
more legislation and regulation, the employer sanctions provisions of
IRCA should be repealed.
